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MICHAEL BOUDIN† 
Two quotations derived from Professor Ramseyer’s article 
provide a point of departure. One is from Judge Harry Edwards who, 
apropos of a study correlating appointing presidents with voting 
patterns on the D.C. Circuit, remarks on “the heedless observations 
of academic scholars who misconstrue and misunderstand the work 
of . . . judges.”1 The other is Professor Ramseyer’s reply that Judge 
Edwards “misses the point” because the (alleged) fact that judges 
“act politically in political cases simply reflects their essential 
independence”; this, Professor Ramseyer said, in an earlier draft, 
should not “embarrass” the judges but “should engender pride.”2 
Figuring out why judges decide cases the way they do is a worthy 
enterprise; not so scoring judicial results as “political.” True, a layman 
might be surprised were he to listen in on a semble—the meeting in 
which judges, after oral arguments, meet to discuss their tentative 
views. Discussion is not confined to abstract rules or the parsing of 
precedents. But the balance of considerations even in highly charged 
cases could hardly be described as “political” in the common sense of 
reflecting partisan politics. The charged term “political” could be 
used only by extending it to include almost any kind of practical 
consideration—as opposed to pure precedent. 
Practical considerations are likely to get weight whenever the law 
allows some latitude for judgment—as it typically does in cases any 
lawyer thinks worth appealing. Examples might be whether the 
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defendant is clearly guilty or arguably innocent, whether the trial 
judge competently conducted the proceedings below, whether (in a 
lay sense) the result is just or unjust, whether further litigation (for 
example, by a remand) would be a waste of time and money, and 
whether an issue is well-enough briefed to be safely decided. The list 
could go on and on. 
These considerations are often connected to legal rules. Thus, 
the weight of evidence as to guilt or innocence may bear on whether 
an error was prejudicial; adequacy of briefing may be relevant to 
forfeiture of an issue in the appeal. In all events, common-sense 
assessments of this kind are inherent: deciding cases is not about 
abstractions but about getting real-world controversies resolved with 
such fairness and predictability as fallible beings and imperfect 
institutions can manage. 
Leeway is often present in cases in which public policy issues are 
at stake. Statutes, often unclear in their wording, may also be unclear 
in their purpose and legislative history. Constitutional provisions are 
often cast in vague terms (“freedom of speech” or “equal 
protection”). Common law doctrine evolves in light of experience and 
expectations. Canons that purport to reflect public policy conflict with 
one another. Judges ought to put aside personal preferences, but they 
can hardly avoid bringing a worldview to the choices that many such 
cases present. 
How one thinks that the world works—for example, how reliable 
is eyewitness identification or how widespread is discrimination 
against a type of disability—may be as important as any value 
judgment in framing rules or making decisions in cases. On both 
scores, predictions are possible as to an individual’s outlook. So some 
correlation between the views of an appointing president and the 
outlook of an appointed judge is hardly surprising, although 
Theodore Roosevelt was famously unhappy with Holmes and 
Eisenhower with Warren. 
But to call judges’ subsequent choices in public policy cases 
“political” is mere provocation. One can reply blandly that these 
decisions are political in the sense that they relate to public policy, 
but few lay readers (or judges) will take it that way. Policy often 
matters in deciding cases, but it is usually policy attributable to 
Congress or to public policy reflected in case law, common sense, and 
the values of the community. Where exactly should judges look when 
existing law stops short? 
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There is blame enough to go around. Judicial decisions often 
convey the sense that the result reached follows mechanically from 
clear and fixed legal rules. Sometimes this is so, but difficult cases are 
as much about creating law as discovering it. Judges may feel uneasy 
at the freedom open to them, but choice is inevitable in judging and 
the public’s confidence could well be enhanced by decisions that face 
up this necessity and offer reasons that most would think sensible for 
whatever choice is made. 
Among judges most admired for the quality of their work are 
those, like Robert Jackson and Learned Hand, who most fully and 
often in highly practical terms explained just how they came to their 
conclusions. It is no wonder that decisions like Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Co. v. Sawyer3 and United States v. Carroll Towing Co.4 retain 
their force even today. Law is assuredly based on rules, but the rules 
are often unclear and perpetually incomplete or (like sand castles at 
the beach) are perfected and then undermined by new conditions. 
On balance, more candor from the courts would likely be a good 
thing—not only about how judges think and what they rely upon in 
deciding cases, but also about workload, time pressure, isolation, use 
of law clerks, and other aspects of the job. Disclosure, like everything 
else, has reasonable outer limits but they have not yet been 
approached. On the scholars’ side, a little more care in how their 
conclusions are packaged and explained might also be in order. 
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